Военная история
Stolfi, Russel H. S.
Hitler's Panzers East:
World War II Reinterpreted

«Военная литература»: militera.lib.ru
Издание: Stolfi R. H. S. Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted. - University of Oklahoma Press. Norman and London, 1991.
Книга одним файлом: http://militera.lib.ru/h/0/one/stolfi1.rar
OCR, правка: Иван Дубрава
Дополнительная обработка: Hoaxer (hoaxer@mail.ru)
{1} Так помечены ссылки на примечания. Примечания после текста книги.
Publishers Weekly: According to received wisdom, the turning point of WW II in Europe was the battle of Stalingrad, but Stolfi argues persuasively that the first phase of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's invasion of Russia, was the decisive event. Barbarossa began on June 22, 1941; by mid-August the Germans had defeated eight of nine Soviet field armies and were in a position to capture Moscow and win the war in Europe. But then Hitler made what Stolfi regards as his most momentous decision of the war: he ordered Army Group Center to veer southward into the Ukraine, despite the objections of several of his generals. With the subsequent loss of German momentum, the Soviets gained time to mobilize and eventually drove the invader out of Russia. The author demonstrates that the fьhrer was strategically ultraconservative, primarily interested in improving the 'siege lines' that ringed the Fatherland and that his diversion into the Ukraine was an expression of this. Stolfi ...has written a credible reevaluation of the war.
Об авторе: R. H. S. Stolfi is Professor of Modern European History at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. With the distinguished German military writer, Frederick William von Mellenthin, he is the coauthor of NATO Under Attack.
Содержание

Preface

PART I. HITLER, THE SOLDIERS, AND GERMAN DECISIONS, 1939-1941

Chapter One. Hitler's Decision to Attack the Soviet Union: Reaction to British Survival or Drive for Final Supremacy in the East?

Chapter Two. German Calculation of the Rigors of an Attack Against the Soviet Union: Accurate Appraisal or Underestimation?

Chapter Three. Hitler and the Opening Battles of Three Great Blitz Campaigns: Comparing the Strategic Picture in Barbarossa with that in France and the Balkans

PART II. THE OPENING STAGES OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

Chapter Four. Barbarossa North, the Great Opportunity in the Baltic: June 1941

Chapter Five. Barbarossa South, the Fight in the Ukraine: June 1941

Chapter Six. Army Group Center Destroys the Soviet Field Armies on the Road to Moscow in June and July 1941, Dragging a Reluctant Hitler Toward Victory

PART III. THE DEFEAT OF THE SOVIETS IN FRONT OF MOSCOW

Chapter Seven. Comparing the Fight in France with that in White Russia in June and July 1941

Chapter Eight. Reevaluating the German Advance Through White Russia in June and July 1941

Chapter Nine. The German Capability to Advance on Moscow in August 1941: Possibilities Based on the August Situation and the Actual German Offensive of 2 October 1941

Chapter Ten. German Casualties and Tank Losses: Did the Germans Have the Combat Strength to Seize Moscow in the Summer of 1941?

Chapter Eleven. German Logistics: Could the Germans Support an Advance into the Moscow-Gorki Space in the Summer of 1941?

PART IV. EXAMINING THE POSSIBILITIES OF AUGUST 1941

Chapter Twelve. Constructing an Alternate Historical Past: Taking Moscow and Defeating the Soviet Union, August-October 1941

PART V. REINTERPRETING WORLD WAR II

Chapter Thirteen. Hitler: The German Fuhrer Driven by a Siege Mentality

Chapter Fourteen. World War II: Barbarossa, the Hinge of Fate?

Notes

Bibliography