Содержание
«Военная Литература»
Военная история

Notes

Hoaxer: Примечания даны фактически без проверки. если у кого-то есть желание/возможность их почистить, буду рад.

Chapter One

{1}Even in defeat, the Germans have gained the reputation of superiority In military operations in the First and Second World Wars. See, for example. Hart. German Generals Talk. p. 300; Dupuy, A Genius for War. p. 257; and Creveld, Fighting Power.
{2}See, for example, Domberg, Munich 1923, pp. 248-315: Richard Hanser, Putsch!. pp. 345-65. for the dangers; and Pest, Hitler, pp. 221-37. for the disruption of the party.
{3}See the particularly emphatic comments in Helmuth Grelner, Operation Barbarossa (c. 1947), pp. 4.5. U.S. Army, European Command, Historical Division. MS C-0651.
{4}See Waite, Psychopathic God. p. xi.
{5}Observe the operative psychology in Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter, pp. 153, 154, In which the author quotes Hitler: "I needed an alibi. . . with the German people to show them that I had done everything to maintain peace. That explains my generous offer of the Danzig and Corridor questions."
{6}Particularly from 1929 to 1939. Goring was probably right when he is quoted in Manvell and Fraenkel. Goering. p. 353, as saying, "I want to emphasize in all important political questions I was, of course, included." Once the war began, however, it is accurate to generalize that Curing was eclipsed as an Influence over Hitler and that "even to Goring It must have become clear in the war that his influence had diminished to the vanishing point." See In Bweley, Hermann Goring, p. 387.
{7}Warlimont. Inside Hitler's Headquarters, pp. 115-17. See also Manstein, Lost Victories, p. 165.
{8}See, for example. Fest. Hitler, p. 600.
{9}See especially Maser, Hitler, pp. 210. 212. 213.

Chapter Two

{1}XXXXVII. Panzer Korps. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 2. Aniagen Nr. 1-100. 20.5-27.6. 1941. 13468/1. BundesarchivMilitararchiv. Freiburg, FRG.
{2}See the succinct discussion of daring and boldness in Ziemke, German Northern Theatre, pp. 109,110.
{3}The German Campaign in Russia. Planning and Operations (1940-1942) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1955). p. 4.
{4}Generalmajor Peter von der Groeben, interview Celle-Boye. FRG, 24 January 1980. Commenting retrospectively, Groeben noted, "We did not believe in the success of the war."
{5}See in Der Oberbefehishaber des Heeres. Gen. St. d. H. Op. Abt. (la). . . H.Qu. O.K.H.. den 8.3.1941. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands, Army Corps, Microcopy Т-Э14. Roll 1389, Frs. 000087-000089. which contains OKH directions for training for the war in the east. The directions list virtually every situation that the Germans met and show an almost uncanny grasp of the challenges of a war in Soviet Russia.
{6}See, for example. Aniage 5c zu OKH Gen. St. d. H. Op. Abt. ?. 050/41 a. Kdos. (Chetsache). Weisung fur den Einsatz der Flakverbande. U.S. National Archives. Records German Army High Command, Microcopy T-78, Roll 335. Fr. 6291343. in which OKH states, "In contrast to the Polish and Western campaigns . . . heavy air attacks must be expected against troops."
{7}Halder. Diaries, vol. 6. p. 34. Entry of 24 March 1941.
{8}Halder, Diaries, vol. 6. p. 9. Entry of 27 February 1941.
{9}One must be struck by the realism of Halder in comments such as, "The imposing vastness of the spaces In which our troops are now assembling cannot fail to strike a deep Impression. . . all the work of decades that was undertaken to train the division commanders for Independent leadership must pay dividends here." See Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 147.
{10}Guderian. Achtung Panzer! p. 148.
{11}See Questions Asked General Guderian and Answers Given by General Guderian (Steinlager Allendorf, 16 December, 1946), p. 1. U.S. Army, European Command. Historical Division. MS B-271, Guderian notes. "{He} reckoned on 17-20.000. But Hitler and the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacbt did not believe it."
{12}Generalmajor Rudolf Loytved-Hardegq, interview, NUmberg, FRG. 18 January 1980.
{13}OKW Operations Staff. Section L. War Diary. 9 January 1941. as cited In Warlimont, inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 140.
{14}See for example. Combat in the East. Experiences of German Tactical and Logistical Units in Russia (1952). p. 58, U.S. Army. European Command. Historical Division. MS B-266. The comment is made: "The only possible solution for this catastrophe-and this is the proper term for it-{would have} consisted of having strong details equipped with heavy cross country tractors tow the columns from the mud by working day and night."
{15}Halder assigned Generalmajor Erich Marcks the job of putting together the army plan of attack on the Soviet Union and Marcks's plan served as the basis for army thinking from that point forward (5 August 1940). Prior to assigning Marcks the job, Halder had worked out the possibilities for an advance In the east and had passed on those ideas to his planner. Halder also represented complete continuity in the planning for Barbarossa, making it most reasonable to generalize about the army plan as being that of Halder. See also Halder, Diaries, vol. 4, pp. 132, 146, entries for 26 July and I August 1940, respectively.
{16}See, for example, Greiner, Operation Barbarossa. pp. 43-51, U.S. Army, European Command. MS 065-i.
{17}See Franz Halder, Decisions Affecting the Campaign in Russia (1941 -1942) (September 1949). p. I, D.S. Army, European Command, Historical Division. MS C-067a.

Chapter Three

{1}As quoted in English In Manstein, Lost Victories, p. 97. See also the similar wording In Trevor-Roper. Blitzkrieg to Defeat, p. 13, for the OKW directive.
{2}The chief of staff of German Army Group A in the west. Generalmajor Erich von Manstein, notes this point with deadly precision and concern, leading to a revised plan for the offensive in the west. See Manstein, Lost Victories, p. 99, where he states: "The 197) operational plan. . . contained no clear cut intention of lighting the campaign to a victorious conclusion. Its object was quite clearly partial victory {italics In original}."
{3}See Hitler's comments in Halder, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 23, entry for 7 October 1939.
{4}Hitler had good reason for being concerned about a preemptive allied move into Belgium and Holland. See International Military Tribunal, Trial ofthe Major War Criminals. vol. 41, pp. 126-30, which presents German translations of Allied documents that in turn show Allied planning In April-November 1939 for the potential occupation of Belgium and parts of the Netherlands.
{5}See, for example, the comments in Warlimont. Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 138.
{6}See the unelaborated comments in Halder, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 43. entry for 3 November 1939.
{7}See. for example, the comments in Halder. Diaries, vol. 2, p. 18, entry for 29 September 1939: "Techniques of Polish campaign no recipe for the West. No good against a well-knit army."
{8}See Jacobsen. Fall Gelb. pp. 32. 39ff.
{9}Photostat copies of partially burned originals now in archives of the Historical Section of the Belgian army, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California. The photostats show that the Belgians seized enough of the German operations order to have an accurate impression of the attack through Belgium. The Germans, of course, did not know the extent of the Intact papers In the hands of the Belgians and could only assume that the plan was known to the Belgians and they had passed on the same Information to the Western Allies. Recent historical research indicates that the latter assumption was false.
{10}See Manstein, Lost Victories, pp. 121, 122. comments about 17-20 February 1940. See also the comments of the army chief of staff earlier in the month of February, which confirm the swing of OKH towards Manstelris ideas in Halder, Diaries, vol. 2, pp. 61-63.
{11}Hitler still managed to Interfere partially, particularly in the details of the surrender of Greece, but not in a way that threatened the swift completion of military operations. See. for example, Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, pp. 128-31, and Halder, Diaries. vol. 6. pp. 36, 53. 64, for details of Hitler's interference.
{12}Halder commented laconically that "rapid preparations based on skill and flexibility of general staff allow attack day morning of 6 April 41." See also Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 52.
{13}Geisler et al., Unser Kampf auf dem Balkan, p. 281. The number includes army, Watfen SS. and air force.
{14}See in, Alfred Philippi and Ferdinand Heim. DerFeldzuggegen Sowfetrussland. p. 49, where late spring thaws are noted as delaying the opening of Barbarossa over and above the engagement in the Balkans.

Chapter Four

1. See Greiner, Operation Barbarossa. p. 51ff. U.S. Army. European Command, Historical Division, MS C-0651.

2. See, for example. Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg to Defeat, p. 49. See also Peter de Mendelssohn. Die Nurnberger Dokumente. pp. 318-22. for a complete picture of the Hitler directive, from which the above quote can also be extracted. Note unally Oberkommando des Heeres. Gen. St. d. H. Op. Abt. (1). Nr. 050/41 q. Kdos.. H.Qu/OKH. den 22fanuar 1941. Aufmarschaoweisung Barbarossa, U.S. National Archives, Records German Army High Command, Microcopy T-78, Roll 335. Fr. 6291211, in which is found the Army mission: "to overthrow Soviet Russia in a quick campaign."

3. Greiner. Operation Barbarossa. p. 52. See also the similar arguments In Warlimont. Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 138.

4. Trevor-Roper, Hitler's War Directives, p. 51.

5. See. for example, the details on the number of streams (forty-one total) to be crossed by Panzer Group 4 en route to the Dvina in Aniage II zu Kdo. d. Pz. Gr. 4. la. Nr. 20/41 g. Kdos.. Chefsache vom 2.5.1941, U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands, Army Corps. Microcopy T-314, Roll 1389, Fr. 000166.

6. See KomniandoderPanzergruppe4. Abt. la, 249/41 g. Kdos.. Chefsache. den 14.6.1941. Befehl fur den Einsatz des "Lehr-Regiment Brandenburg z.b.V. 800" U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands. Army Corps. Microcopy Т-Э14. Roll 1389. Frs. 000131. 000152, in which Brandenburg special forces are attached to Panzer Group 4, 56th Panzer Corps, and specifically to the 8th Panzer Division.

7. Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 174.

8. Guderian. Panzer Leader, p. 92.

9. Ibid.

10. Manstein, Lost Victories, p. 183.

11. See Panzergruppe 4. la. 14.6.1941. Brandenbuig. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands. Army Corps. T-314. Roll 1389. Fr. 000152. and Der Kom-mandierende General. Gen. Kdo. LVI. A.K. (mot), la 46/47. g. K.... 4.6.41. U.S. Archives, Records German Field Commands, Army Corps. Microcopy T-314. Roll 1389. Fr. 000162. In the latter source Manstein comments on the possible use of underwater battle tanks (prepared for the potential invasion of Britain) in a crossing of the Dvina River.

12. Manstein, Lost Victories, pp. 184, 185.

13. The Germans considered that the engagement took place from 24 to 26 June 1941, with the 41st Panzer Corps free to advance from 27 June onward. See in Oberkommando 6. Pz. D.. la. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands, Divisions. Microcopy T-315, Roll 326. Fr. 000049.

14. See, for example, the details in Small Unit Actions during the German Campaign in Russia (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 76-84.

15. See in K.T.B. Nr. 3 der 6. Schiltzen Brigade fur die Zeitvom 21.6.41 bis 22.11.41. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands, Divisions, Microcopy T-315. Roll 322. Fr. 000865. and Chales de Beaulieu. Der Vorstoss der Panzergruppe 4 mi Leningrad. pp. 31-34.

16. See Der Befehishaber der Panzergruppe 4. Gr. H.Qu. den 1.7.41, an die Herren Kom-mandierenden Generals derXXXXL undLVL A.K.. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands. Army Corps. Microcopy Т-Э14, Roll 1389. Fr. 000296.

17. Manstein, Lost Victories, p. 186.

18. The Rossenie tank battle was tough but brief. The 1st Panzer Division used 100 percent of its initial Issue of 5-cm РАК (antitank) ammunition from 22 to 26 June 1941, most of it in that tank battle, but nevertheless "broke through" to Jakobstadt by 28 June 1941. See in XXXXI. Pz. K. Munitions Bericht. 22-26.6.41. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands. Divisions. Microcopy T-315. Roll 326, Fr. 000193.

19. Gen. }. A. Graf von Kielmansegg, interview. Bad Krozingen, FRG. 19 January 1980.

20. Later, on 14 July 1941, north of Pskov and well on the way to Leningrad, these same forces would still have a reasonable chance for a quick breakthrough to that city. 21. See Chales de Beaulieu. Der Vorstoss der Panzergruppe 4 auf Leningrad, p. 30.

Chapter Five

1. See U.S. Army, German Campaign Russia, 1940-1942, p. 34, under "Changes in Plans (March-April 1942)."

2. See Panzergruppe I, lc/AO an OKH Frernde Heer Ost. Abendmeldung. 3.7.41. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies, Microcopy T-313, Roll 9. Fr. 7235678, in which Interrogation reports note that Soviet commissars since 1939 had been declaring in front of Polish road workers that the USSR would attack Germany when It was sufficiently weak in the west.

3. Generalkommando XI. A.K.. lc. den 22.9.1941. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands Panzer Armies, Microcopy Т-Э13. Roll II. Frame 7237777.

4. Halder. Diaries, vol. 6. p. 209, entry for 7 July 1941.

5. Halder. Diaries, vol. 7, p. 6, entry for I August 1941, shows, for example, the Army Group South estimate of forty-one German infantry divisions versus twenty-nine Soviet rifle divisions.

6. There are notable exceptions to this generalization. See, for example, Luther, "German Armoured Operations," Army Quarterly and Defence Journal 108 (4). 7. Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 220, entry for 10 July 1941.

Chapter Six

1. See Fedor von Bock. Tagebuchnotizen Osten I (Oberbefehisbaber d. H. Gru. Mitte. Unterstellt: Pz. Gru. 2. Pz. Gru. 3. 4. Armee. 9. Armee). 22.6.1941 bis 5.1.42. Bundesardiiv. Militararchiv. Freiburg. FRG. pp. 3. 7. 12.

2. See Halder. Diaries, vol. 6. p. 183. entry for 28 June 1941. Halder notes after a midaf-ternoon telephone conversa-tion with Keltel at OKW that he "again indicates that the Fuh-rer is worried ... about the possibility that Army Group Center might strike too soon beyond the line Minsk-Bobruisk before the pocket is completely liquidated."

3. See Bock. Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. pp. 2, 3, entries for 23-25 June 1941. where the diarist comments. "The further forward movement of Panzer Group Hoth raised the burning question whether Hoth . . . should go into the region north of Minsk or immediately In the direction WItebsk-Polozk {i.e., on to Smolensk}."

4. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 6. p. 250.

5. See Bock, Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. II, the entry for 2 July 1941. where he notes, "I must also say to {Hitler} that the setting out of the Panzer Groups is naturally from a flying start."

6. See, for example, Maser, Hitler, p. 210 and as suggested on p. 220.

7. The Germans took huge numbers of prisoners in the last hours of fighting around the pockets, for example: "The pocket west of Minsk is slowly burning out. Since yesterday morning 52,000 Russians have surrendered." Halder, Diaries, vol. 6. p. 201, entry for 5 July 1941.

8. See Bock, Tagebuchnotizen Osten I, pp. 12. 13.

9. See Heeresgruppe Mitte. lc/A.O.. H.Qu.. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies. Microcopy Т-31Э. Roll 131. Fr. 7379183. in which German intelligence in Army Group Center notes for the benefit of the panzer army and groups under command that the Soviets instituted war commissars on 16 July 1941.

10. Bock, Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. 13. He notes: "A big day: the panzer groups continue the advance eastward, Guderian gets across the Beresina to Rogachev . . . Hoth on his left flank to the Dvina."

11. See Halder. Diaries, vol. 2. p. 23. entry for 7 October 1939. "Fuhrer emphasizes: a) The Belgians will call the French to come to their aid. We must not wait for that. France will do that in the period of the autumn fogs; b) We must forestall this with an operation designed to gain a decision even if we fall short of the original objectives and attain only a line which would afford better protection of the Ruhr."

12. Halder, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 25. entry for 10 October 1939, in which Hitler in a memorandum read to OKH states. "Mobilize everything to the last and as quickly as possible" to extend the safety zone of the Ruhr In the west in the event of an enemy movement into Belgium.

13. Halder. Diaries, vol. 3, p. 115. entry for 8 March 1940. Halder was thinking In terms of an attack in force across the Mouse only after fourteen days into the campaign. The actual attack took place at a classical blitz pace on the afternoon of the fourth day of the offensive.

14. See Baick. General der Panzertruppe. p. 270. the authoritative opinion that Guderian "alone had believed in success," specifically In the capability of the panzer army to force an Immediate crossing of the Mouse and defeat the Allied armies on the continent, "and had led a heavy battle against the whole world."

15. See, for example, Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 58, and, In a slightly different vein, Halder, Diaries, vol. 2, p. 43. entry for 3 November 1939. Halder noted that "none of the higher headquarters thinks that the offensive ordered by OKW has any prospects of success." 16. See Greiner, Operation Barbarossa. p. 59, where Greiner paraphrases Hitler as saying in December 1941 that the most important task in Barbarossa is "the rapid cutting off of the Baltic area."

17. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 172. entry for 25 June 1941. and the timidity revealed: "Later in the evening we receive a Filhrer order . . . it betrays concern that we are already operating too deeply into the Soviet Union . . . the same old refrain!"

18. See, for example, Autmaischweisung "Barbarossa." HeeKSgruppe Mitte. den 12.3.1941. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands. Army Groups, Microcopy T-311. Roll 216. Fr. 000651. In which Bock unequivocably directs his forces into the space around Smolensk to destroy the enemy forces In White Russia "as the basis for the continuation of further operations in an eastward or northeastward direction," i.e., toward Moscow.

19. See Hoth. Panzer-Operationen. pp. 26, 27.

20. See the matter of fact and businesslike way in which the Germans began planning in Jacobsen. Marcks. p. 92, and Halder. Diaries, vol. 4, pp. 132-35. 145, 146, In which the German army develops a simple, decisive plan requiring boldness and dash in the advance but giving considerable chance of success.

21. See, for example, the Introduction of General der Infanterie Rudolph M. Hofmano: German Army War Games. U.S. Army. European Command, Historical Division. MS P-094.

22. Halder, Diaries, vol. 6. p. 161, entry for Sunday, 22 June 1941.

23. See R. H. S. Stolft et al.. German Disruption of Soviet Command: Control and Communications in Barbarossa. 1941 (Monterey. California: 1983). pp. 72-75. 79. 80.

24. As stated in an interview with Brigadegeneral Rudolf Loytved-Hardegg. Nurnberg, FRG, 18 January 1980.

25. An additional eighteen aircraft were destroyed in various accidents Including especially malfunctioning of bomblet munitions upon landing after return from the combat sorties. See Stolfi et al' German Disruption of Soviet Command, p. 225, in which thirty-five German aircraft are noted as lost on the first day of the war. The authors estimate that approximately seventeen were lost to enemy action and eighteen to various accidents and misadventures, for example, explosions of fused and activated cluster bomblets.

26. As described in an interview with Generalmajor Peter von der Groeben, Celle-Boye, FRG, 24 January 1980. See also Fedor von Bock. Tagebuch-Notizen. Band 4. 20.9.40-21.6.41. p. 19, Hoover Institution Archives, in which Bock notes the game but gives little detail on the results and concerns.

27. See Bock, Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. 2.

28. Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 164.

29. Halder, Diaries, vol. 6. p. 166.

30. Interview, Groeben, January 1980.

31. See Bock, Tagebuch-Notizen. vol. 4, pp. 18. 19. entry for 30 March 1941.

32. Ibid.. p. 14, entry for 18 March 1940. Bock notes that "Hoth looked at the other side of the Dnieper and Duna from the first and considered the possibilities of only incidentally attacking and smashing the enemy standing farther forward {between Bialystok and Minsk}."

33. In the first three months of Barbarossa, approximately one-third of the fuel used by German army units came from supplies captured from the Soviets.

34. Hoover Archives. Bock. Tagebuch-Notizen. vol. 5. pp. 15. 18, 19.

35. Oberkommando der 4. Panzer Armee. Abt. lc. den 22.7.1941. Feindnachrichtenblatt No. 4. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field commands. Panzer Armies, Microcopy T-313. Roll 131, Frame 7378916.

36. A Soviet mechanized brigade, also referred to In the literature as a motorized-mechanized brigade and sometimes as a tank brigade, was a powerful tank-heavy unit holding 160 battle tanks, 19 reconnaissance tanks, and 24 armored cars, that is, roughly as much armor as a German panzer division. See O.K.H., Gen st d H. U.S. Archives, Records of Headquarters German Army High Command, Microcopy T-78, Roll 335. Fr 6291307.

37. See the telling comments in Shtemenko, Soviet General Staff, pp. 378, 379. in which the author quotes Josef Stalin's great toast to the Russian people at the end of the Second World War. The toast reveals monumental anxiety on the part of Stalin over the issue of the loss of Soviet territory in 1941. The anxiety supports a view that he did not feel that his regime could survive the loss of Moscow.

38. German aerial photography of June and July 1941 tends to confirm the obvious. See in Halder. Diaries, vol. 6, pp. 251, 252. The entry for 17 July 1941 notes "photographs of Moscow, very extensive industrial installations with vast railways system. Strong AAA defenses . . . no fortifications." And, "With the elimination of Moscow the entire Russian communications network collapses."

39. Oberkommando der 4. Panzer Armee. Abt. lc. den 19.7.41. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 131, Fr. 7378936.

40. 0berkommandoder4. Panzer Armee. Abt. lc. den22.7.41. FeindnachrichtenblattNr. 4, U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Fr. 7378916.

41. See. for example, Gen. Kdo. LVH. A.K. (mot.) lc. Tatigkeitsbericht. v. 22.6. -31.12.41. 15683/20. Bundesarchiv Militararchiv, Freiburg, FRG. p. 2. where the report notes: "Russian Oberleutnant says under interrogation. . . that the war comes as a complete surprise. In his unit no live cartridges had yet been handed out."

42. See, for example, Pz. Gp. 3. K.T.B. Nr. 1. 22.6.41. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands. Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 225. Fr. 7488960. The 56th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Army Corps "despite battle, difficult terrain, and hot weather. completed a distance of 40km" in the fifteen hours and ten minutes from 0305 to 1815 on 22 June 1941. The corps was under control of Panzer Group 3 (Hoth) on that day northwest of Bialystok.

43. See. for example, Pz.Gr. 3. lc. Abendmeldung, 8.7.41.. U.S. National Archives, Rec ords German Field Commands, Panzer Armies, Microcopy T-313. Roll 9, Fr. 7235690, in which "according to information from III. A K., 150 German soldiers from 25.1.D. (mot.) have been murdered in Russian captivity. Further reports lie in front of us in two other cases."

44. Manstein. Lost Victories, p. 180.

45. Ibid., p. 45.

46. See. for example, in Army Group South. 3. A.K., lc. an Pz.Gr. 1. lc. 1.7 {1941}. 2250. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies, Microcopy T-313, Roll 10. Fr. 7236715, in which the report reads, "German prisoners of I.R. 35 mishandled by Russians . . . other prisoners bestially murdered. Investigation to follow."

47. One must be struck by the use of knives in the killings and mutilations. See. for example, Panzergruppe 1. Abt. lc/AO. Abendmeldung. den 25.6.41. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands. Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 9, Fr. 7235663, which comments: "In front of III. A.K. eleven wounded German soldiers who had fallen Into Russian hands in a counterattack were murdered by stab wounds In the back."

48. See, for example. Pz. A.O.K. 2 (Pz. Gr. 2). Abt. la. Ani. k. K.T.B. Nr. I (I.Band). 1.7.41. RH 21-2/V. 113. Bundesarchiv Militararchiv. Freiburg. FRG. in which appears: "1) Enemy situation, . . . b) . . . The Russian . . . beheves the principle drummed into him by his commissars that he will be shot if captured. This Is the main reason why he will not allow himself to be captured."

49. 1. Bataillon. Schiltzen-Regiment 64. anill. Pz.K.. Abt. lc. 30.6/41. Subject. Discovery of the Mutilated Personnel. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies. Microcopy Т-31Э, Roll 10, Fr. 7236663.

50. See, for example, Femschreiben. III. A.K. lc. an Panzergruppe 1. lc. Zwischenmel-dung. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands. Panzer Armies, Microcopy T-313, Roll 10, Fr. 7236392, and Int. Regt. Grossdeutschland. Abt. lc. Regt. Gefechtsstand. den 16. V11.41. . . . Meldungen. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 131. Fr. 7379074.

51. See, for example, A.O.K. 6. lc. an Panzeignippe 1. lc. 8.8.41, 0735. Intelligence Report. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 10. Fr. 7236483.

52. As noted, for example, in HI. A.K... lc. an Panzergnippe 1. 9.7.41. 1430. Intelligence Report. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands. Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313, Roll 10. Fr. 7236434.

53. Ibid.

54. See Pz. A.O.K. 2 (Pz. Gi. 2). Abt. la. Ani. k. K.T.B. Ni.-il. Band). 1.7.41. 24b. Ver-nehmung Generalmajorfegorow. RH 21-2/V.113. Bundesarchiv Milltararchiv, Freiburg. FRG. where the captured Russian general gives "as a reason for the panic and disintegration . . . the sealing off or flanking fires by German artillery and machine guns."

55. Russian troops were forced by their own officers and commissars to stay in the fight. See. for example. Int. Regt. Grossdeutschland. Abt.lc ... 18.V11.41. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands. Panzer Armies, Microcopy T-313, Roll 131. Fr. 7379079. in which the report notes, "Russian Infantry Regiment 130 compelled {by force of arms} to fight by one colonel, two majors, three commissars, and 10 other officers . . . according to prisoner statements."

56. See DerOberbefehlsbaberderHeeiesg{uppeMitte.H.Qu.. 19.10.1941. Tagesbefehl. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Forces. Copy Т-Э12, Roll 145. Fr. 7684400. The document is reproduced as part of the records of the German 4th Army.

57. As described in an Interview with Generalma/or Eberhard Wagermann, Rheinbach. FRG, 18 January 1980.

58. Ibid.

59. Jurgens. Meine Schwadron. p. 28. Herbert Frisch wrote the piece above based on his combat on 20 July 1941 in the Horse Squadron, 26th Reconnaissance Battalion, 26th Infantry Division, 6th Corps, 9th Army, Army Group Center, near the little Russian village of Besenjata.

Chapter Seven

1. Map of European Russia shows the formidable space to be overcome by the Germans in the western campaign.

2. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 4, p. 9.

3. This generalization is based on Guderian's panzer corps' being backed in the second wave by the 16th Panzer Corps (Reinhardt) and 14th Motorized Infantry Corps (Wieter-scheim). and thus his corps being associated with enough mass and mobility to comprise the Scbwerpunkt force in the west. Just to the north, around Dinant on the Mouse, General der Panzertruppe Hermann Hoth skillfully led the 15th Panzer Corps in the 4th Army across the Meuse at approximately the same time as Guderian but without the decisive reinforcing mass.

4. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 4. p. 18: "Fuehrer Hq. sees it differently . . . {the Fuehrer} rages and screams that we are on the best way to ruin the whole campaign. . . . He won't have any part of continuing the operation in a westward direction."

5. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 6. p. 172, where he notes; "Later in the evening we receive a Fuehrer order on the direction of operations of Army Group Center. . . . It betrays concern that we are operating too far in depth. . . . The old refrain . . . "

Chapter Eight

1.The Germans used the colorful term "burning out" for the end of resistance In the Kessein. See, for example. Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 201.

2. Bock. Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. 12. entry for 2 July 1941.

3. See, Bock, Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. 12. where diarist notes on 2 July 1941, "By my way of thinking we had already waited too long."

4. Bock notes earlier on 8 July 1941 that Guderian had been forced to give up a bridgehead across the Dnieper at Rogachev. "voluntarily or involuntarily is not clear." See Bock, Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. 19. Note also Geschichte der 3. pp. 126-28.

5. See in Geschichte der 3. pp. 124. 125. where the division successfully crossed the Dnieper on 4 July 1941 but drew so much Soviet attention that it was never able to break out from this original bridgehead.

6. Bock, Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. 23. noted on 13 July 1941 that the one place on the eastern front where the Russians had been smashed was opposite Army Group Center and that the way to Moscow was open.

7. Halder. Diaries, vol. 6. p. 233.

8. See the estimate of Soviet strength submitted by Army Group Center In Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 215, as supplemented for the estimated number of cavalry divisions from Panzer Gruppe 4. lc. Feindlage. 20.5.41. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands. Army Corps. Microcopy T-314. Roll 415, Fr. 8708963, which shows an estimated six Soviet cavalry divisions in White Russia on 20 May 1941.

9. Bock. Tagebuchnotizen Osten I, p. 14, notes that by 4 July 1941, "In front of 12th Panzer Division near Minsk 50,000 men had surrendered."

10. See Heeresgruppe Mitte. lc/A.O.. H.Qu. den 15.7.41. Gefangene und Beute aus der Doppleschlacht von Bialystok und Minsk, U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies. Copy T-313, Roll 131. Fr. 7378942.

11. See General der Gebirgstruppen. a.D.. Georg Ritter von Henzl. Corps von Henzel (20 Apl-6 May 451 (27.4.46). p. 10. U.S. Army. European Command. Historical Section, MS B-326. The author, recounting his experiences early in the Russian campaign, notes. "Enemy infantry advances primarily under accompanying armored protection, shoots its way in and practically never uses orthodox infantry tactics."

12. See Generalkommando XII. A.K.. la. K.Ge{. Stand. 2.7.1941. Kampibericht des XIL A.K. von 27.6. -1.7.41, U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands. Panzer Armies, Microcopy Т-Э13. Roll 82. Fr. 7320919.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., Fr. 7320917.

15. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 206. In which General Ott reports on a visit to Army Group Center: "Russian attack methods: . .. infantry attacking as much as twelve ranks deep without heavy weapons support; the men start hurrahing from far off. Incredibly high Russian losses."

16. As noted in 48. A.K. (mot.), lc. an Panzergruppe 1. lc. 4.7.41. Morgenmeldung. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands. Panzer Armies, Microcopy T-313. Roll 10, Fr. 7236636.

17. See in Halder. Diaries, vol. 7. p. 29. The number-200,000-sits awkwardly in the entry for 8 August 1941 and appears to refer to the Uman encirclement operation, which involved predominately the actions of the German 17th Army and Panzer Group I from 20 July to 7 August 1941.

18. The German SS Division Wiking toward the end of the fighting on the Uman Kessel reported, "One can generally observe that the enemy runs up thickly massed, breaks up on the German fire. and is thrown back." See SS Division Wiking lc. Div. Gef. St.. den 8.8.41. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands. Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 10, Fr. 7236070.

19. See Pz. Gr. 2. la. K.T.B. Nr. 1. 1.7.41. MeldunguberdenEinsatzderBrigadevom28.6. bis 30.6.41. RH 21.2/V 113. Bundesarchiv Militararchiv. Freiburg. FRG. p. 2.

20. Ibid.

21. See Stolfi et al.. German Destruction of Soviet Command, pp. 72-75. 79. 80.

22. See Pz. A.O.K. 2. Abt. la. K.T.B. Nr. 1 (1. Band). 1.7.41. Anlagen k. Feindlage. RH 21-2Л?.113, Bundesarchiv Militararchre, Freiburg, FRG.

23. As stated in an Interview with Generalmajor Guenter Pape, Dusseldorf-Benrath. FRG, 11 January 1980.

24. See, for example, Anlageoband E. Teil 1. zum Tatigkeitsbericht Nr. 2. Panzel-Giuppe 3. Abt. lc. begonnen 22.6.41. U.S. National Archives. Record German Field Commands, Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 223, Fr. 7487604.

25. Pape. interview, Benrath, FRG, January 80.

26. Ibid.

27. For the arrival of the division east of Minsk, see the colorful description in Scheibert, Gespenstei-Division. p. 53.

28. See Pz. Gr. 2. la. K.T.B. Nr. 1. 1.7.41. MelduilguberdenEiiisatzderBrigadevom28.6 bis 30.6.41. RH 21-2/V.113. Bundesarchiv Militararchiv. Freiburg. FRG, p. 2, which states: "The {4th Panzer} Brigade had covered from 27-28 June 1941 around 250 km in 24 hours."

29. See Generalkommando XIV. A.K., Abt. lc. K.H. Qu.. den 5.7.41. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies, Microcopy T-313. Roll 10, Fr. 7236552, In which the German intelligence report states: Out of several documents, the Soviet's state that resistance will be performed to the last man." See also, Pz. Gr. 2. Abt. la. An}, k, K.T.B. Nr. 1. 1.7.41. 146: Armee BefehlNr. 4. RH 21.1/V.113. Bundesarchiv Militararchiv, Freiburg. FRG, in which the order notes: "1) Enemy situation . . . b) Enemy defends himself in many cases with extreme toughness, sometimes to the last cartridge, even In a hopeless situation."

30. See Pz. Gr. 1. la. Funkspruch Nr. 136 an Heeresgmppe Slid 22.7.1941. 2315. Tages-meldung. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies. Microcopy Т-Э13. RoU 5, Fr. 7230203.

31. See Pz. Gr. 2. Abt. la. Ani. k. K.T.B.. Nr. 1. 1.7.41. AbschriftFernsprechbuch. RH 21-2/V.113. Bundesarchiv MilitSrarchlv. Freiburg. FRG, p. 4.

32. See Generalkommando LVII.A.K. (mot.), lc. Tatigkeitsbericht von 22.6.31.12.41. 1568/20. Bundesarchiv Militararchiv. Freiburg. FRG. p. 7.

33. Pz. Gr. 2. Ani. k. K.T.B.. Nr. 1. 11.7.41. TagesmelduagXXXXVII. Pz.K.. RH 21-1/V.123. Bundesarchiv Militararchiv. Freiburg, FRG, p. 48 of file.

34. Prisoners noted In Generalkommando. LVH.Pz.A.K.. Aniage zu Gruppenbetehl Nr. 7. K.T.B.. Ferndiiadirichtenblatt Nr. 8. 28.6.41. 15683/3. Bundesarchiv Militararchiv. Freiburg, FRG.

35. As recounted in Pz. Gr. 2. Ani. k. K.T.B.. Nr. 1. 2.7.41. M.G. Bataillon 5 (mot.). Ge-{echtsberichtdesM. G. Btl.5(mot.) fur dieZeit vom 24.6 N 30.6.41. RH21-2/V.112. Bundesarchiv Militararchiv, Freiburg, FRG.

36. Note Panzer A.O.K. 1. Abt. lc. Abendmeldung. 8.7.41. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies, Microcopy T-313. Roll 9. Fr. 7235690.

37. As reported in Pz. A.O.K. 2. Aolagen. K.T.B.. 4.7.41. Abschrift Fernsprechbuch. no. 2 of index, RH 21-2/V.116, Bundesarchiv Militararchiv. Freiburg. FRG.

38. See Scheibert, Gespenster-Division. p. 54.

39. See Abwehrgruppe beim A.O.K. 4 und bei Panzergruppe 2. Abschrift den 17.7.41. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands. Panzer Armies, Microcopy T-313, Roll 131. Fr. 7379104.

40. See Heeresgruppe Mitte. la. Nr. 104/41 g. Kdos.. Befehl fur die Weiterfiibrung des Operation. RH 21.1/V.113. Bundesarchiv Militararchiv, Freiburg. FRG, in which the order states that "the {infantry} armies must exercise all possibilities, Including the throwing forward of mobile forces, to free the mobile divisions employed in encircling the Novogro-dek pocket."

41. See 18.Pz. Div.. lc. Div. Gef. Stand, den 19.7.41. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 131. Fr. 7379099. where the Germans state, based on prisoner interrogation, that "diverse units thrown back and forth among one another are completely out of touch with the situation" in the fight opposite Panzer Group Guderlan near Smolensk on 19 July 1941.

42. See VIII. A.K.. Abt. lc. Gefangenenvernebrnungen vom 23.6.41-24.10.41. Div. Gel. St. den 7.8.41. Bundesarchiv Militararchiv, Freiburg. FRG. The report states that "the deserters are White Russians and had the firm intention to desert since being drafted even though the commissars had told them that the Germans skinned their prisoners alive."

43. See General der Infanterie Guenther Blumentritt, Thoughts of a Former Soldier on Strategy. Politics, and Psychology of the 1939-45 War (September 1947). p. 35, U.S. Army, European Command, Historical Section, MS B-647.

44. As early as 20 July 1941, Bock was demanding "to thrust farther to the east immediately. until the last reserves of the enemy are smashed." Bock. Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. pp. 36-38. where he also notes that the army group would be able to continue east at the beginning of August.

45. Halder, Diaries, vol. 7, p. II. entry for 2 August 1941 comments. "Situation at Yel-nya: the troops are laughing at Russian attacks with armor and Infantry."

46. The evidence for a voluntary German halt is decisive. Bock. Tagebuchnotizen Osten I, p. 40, states that on 22 July 1941, "Brauchitsch called and said the Fuhrer has ordered that the advance of the armor to the east is no longer a question for consideration."

47. Hauptnaann Noack, Interview, Freiburg, FRG. 21 January 1980. At the beginning of the campaign, Noack was an Oberleutnant in the 7th Panzer Division as part of Panzer Group Hoth. Noack recalled a comment made by Hoth on the eve of Barbarossa to the effect: "The next raid will not be a blitzkrieg but a blitz-blitzkrieg."

48. See Bock, Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. 12, where he rages against halting the panzer groups on 2 July 1941 to ensure holding the Minsk pocket, noting that it would be a "heavy blunder" to allow the Russians to recover from their crushing defeats.

49. Heeresgruppe Mitte. Aufmarschweisung "Barbarossa. " U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands. Army Groups, Microcopy T-311, Roll 216. Fr. 000649.

Chapter Nine

1. See in Warlimont. Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 138, the succinct analysis of Hitler's mentality In going for the incidental. With a stroke of the pen, Hitler fundamentally altered the decisive Halder-army plan in December 1941.

2. Authorities as perceptive as J. F. C. Fuller, as well informed but ideologically constrained as Vladimir Sevruk, and others claim that German casualties were so great that the Moscow time table was thrown off. See, for example. Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, The Second World War. 1939-45: A Strategical and Tactical History (New York; Duell, Sloan. and Pearce, 1949), p. 123. and Sevruk. Moscow, p. II. Their claims that German casualties and staunch Russian resistance halted Barbarossa at the end of July 1941 are without foundation.

3. See the map in Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 187.

4. Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 188: "advanced on foot with the leading rifle company and thus assured that there were no needless delays."

5. SeeGeyer. DasIX.p. 114.

6. Ibid.

7. See Bock, Tagebuchnotizen Osten I, pp. 33. 34, where the field marshal explains that the Schwerpunkt of operations for his army group lay around Smolensk and, "for the defense of the flanks only the least necessary strength would be committed." The diary entry is for 18 July 1941.

8. An early nickname associated with Bock. as noted in Tumey, Disaster at Moscow. p. 72.

9. Panzer Groups 2, 3, and 4 were redesignated panzer armies on I October 1941. See, for example. Scheibert. Gespenster Division, p. 72.

10. See Plocher. German Air Force Versus Russia, pp. 42. 43, which shows immediate German air supremacy followed by operations that concentrated on support of the army rather than continued primary emphasis on air superiority. The author criticizes the Germans for not continuing to emphasize the suppression of the Red Air Force. The Luftwaffe. however, at least concentrated its attacks against the Red Army with results that could have been the final decisive element In the penetration of the German ground armies into the Moscow-Gorki space until August 1941. thus preventing recovery of the Red Air Force by more direct means.

11. See In Stolfi. "Chance in History," pp. 224. 225.

12. See Bock. Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. 115.

13. See Haupt, Kiew-die grosste Kesselscbacht der Geschichte. Note the title: The Greatest Battle of Encirclement in History.

Chapter Ten

1. See in Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 210, the comment by Col. Eberhard Kinzel at the Army General Staff 1100 review of the Russian situation on 8 July 1941.

2. See Halder. Diaries, vol. 6, p. 125. the entry for 20 May 1941. in which Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm, chief of army equipment and commander of the replacement army, presents these figures.

3. Average numbers among nine divisions (four panzer, three infantry, and two motor-ized Infantry) assigned to Panzer Group Guderian on 22 June 1941. See in Pz. A.O.K. 2. H.Qu. den 27 Dezember 1941. Starken Pz. A.O.K. 2. U.S. National Archives, Records of German Field Commands, Panzer Armies, Microcopy Т-31Э. Roll 103. Fr. 7346281.

4. Average numbers among eight divisions (five panzer and three motorized infantry) assigned to Panzer Group Guderian on 23 August 1941. See Pz. A.O.K. 2. H.Qu. den 23.8.1941. Starken Panzergruppe. U.S. National Archives. Records of German Field Commands, Panzer Annies. Copy T-313, Roll 103, Fr. 7346313.

5. Ibid., Fr. 7346281, in which strength figures are given for the same divisions of Panzer Group 2 on 22 June 1941. Comparison shows the Germans operating at 80 percent of their original strength on the later date.

6. Feist and Nowarra, German Panzers.

7. Senger und Etterlin, Kampfpanzer. pp. 63. 68, 423.

8. See Brereton and Feist, Russian Tanks, pp. 12, 20. 32. 33. 48, as supplemented for road ranges by Senger und Etterlin, Kampfpanzer. pp. 357, 362, 386, 391.

9. See in HohererArt- Kdr. 302. la Nr. 588/41 geh. Get. Stand, den 20.10.1941. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands, Armies, Microcopy T-312, Roll 145. Fr. 7684409. where the report comments that the 10.5cm howitzer required the 10.5cm antitank projectile and the number 6 load of propellant to knock out the T-34 at that time.

10. See the German analysis in Pz. A.O.K. 4.1c.... 12.7.1941... Abschrift eines Bench-tea des Pz. Rgts. 25 uber den schwerstea Sowfet Panzerkampfwagen. U. S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands. Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 131. Fr. 7378951. which reveals the challenges of fighting the big Soviet tanks (KV-I, 2) In the Baltic.

11. See in O.K.H. Gen Sta d H. Op. Abt. (1). Nt. 1503/41. g.Kdos. Chef.. Panzerlage. U.S. National Archives. Records Headquarters German Army High Command. Copy T-78. Roll 335. Fr. 6291784. The numbers do not include German tanks manufactured as command vehicles, e.g.. Pz.Kw. 1. Pz.Kw. III. and TNHS 38 Panzerbefehiswagen.

12. See Foss. Illustrated Encyclopedia, p. 173. figure for T-26 tanks.

13. See Senger und Etterlin. Kampfpanzer. pp. 386. 391. Figures are for T-34 and KV tanks manufactured by 22 June 1941.

14. See Christensen, Steinlager Allendorf. trans.. Questions Asked Guderian and Answers Given by Guderian. U.S. Army. European Command. Historical Division, MS B-271. In answer to the question of how many tanks the Germans expected the Russians to have, Guderian notes, "I reckoned on 17-20.000."

15. See Zusammenstellung. U.S. National Archives. Records Headquarters German Armed Forces High Command, Microcopy T-77, Roll 15. Fr. 726363, which presents figures of 13.176 "3.7 cm Pak. u. Pak 38 (5 cm)" for "Bestand 1.5.40." See also Heereswaffenamt. Wa. Stab la 3. Ausschnitt Bestand am 1.7.40. U.S. National Archives, Records Headquarters German Army High Command. Microcopy T-78. Roll 143. Fr. 6973765. The Germans had produced the vast total of 13.029 of the 3.7cm Pak for the antitank defense of the field divisions by I July 1940, according to the source.

16. See, for example, Femschreiben, 3. A.K.. lc. an Panzergruppe 1. 4.7.41. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies. Microcopy Т-31Э, Roll 10, Fr. 7236603. which states: "Russian tanks: seldom more than battalion strength at one time."

17. See Selz. Das Grime Regiment, pp. 58. 59.

18. German infantry in Army Group South faced similar, huge Soviet tank forces. See, for example. A.O.K. 17. K.T.B. Nr. 1. 15.5.41-12.12.41. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands, Armies. Microcopy T-312. Roll 668. Fr. 8301934. in which headquarters, 17th Army. notes: "Around noon {23 June 1941} the 262nd Infantry Division was in danger from about 150 enemy tanks from the area around Kornie."

19. The most powerful antitank gun used by the Germans In Barbarossa, the 5.0cm Pak. was "effective only at ranges under 200 m . .. the {KV heavy} tanks can also be put out of action by chance hits of 5.0 cm Pak at the turret ring." See Pz. A.O.K. 4.1c... 12.7.1941... Abschrift eines Berichten des Pz. Rgts. 25 uber den schwersten Sowfet Panzerkampfwagen. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 131. Fr. 7378951.

20. Note the typical Soviet experience in Oberkommando der 4. Pz. Armee. lc. Interrogation Report. T-34 Crew Member Georgiewitsch Kowalenko. July 1941. US. National Archives. Records German Field Commands. Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 131, Fr. 7378923. where the Soviet tank man in the Soviet 107th Panzer Division notes heavy fighting around Orsha on 9 July 1941 followed by the attempt of a pack of sixty Soviet tanks "to fight Its way eastward through Smolensk" on 17 and 18 July 41 out of the cauldron, 50 to 60 km to the west. Kowalenko notes that only two of the Soviet tanks escaped over the Dnieper toward Smolensk.

21. Note that approximately one month later, under Guderian, the 18th Panzer Division, 47th Panzer Corps would be "standing ready for insertion in further combat at about 60% of its original strength." See 18. Panzer-Division. XXXXVII. Pz. Korps, Meldung vom 15.9.1941 nachdem Stand vom 10.9.1941. U.S. National Archives. Records German Field Commands. Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 103, Frs. 7347178. 7347180.

22. See In Halder, Diaries, vol. 7. p. 17.

23. See Femschreiben. 9. Pz. Div. an Pz. Gr. 1. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands. Panzer Armies. Microcopy T-313. Roll 4. Fr. 7227458, which notes on the day of the start of the campaign that the 9th Panzer Division had "approximately 80 percent of the wheeled motor vehicles of the division ready for Insertion in combat."

24. See Author No. 313, Antitank Defense in the East (April. 1947). p. 3. U.S. Army. European Command, Historical Division. MS D-253.

Chapter Eleven

1. See Dahms, f3er Zweite Weltkrieg. p. 54.

2. Creveld, Supplying War.

3. For such details note especially Stolfi, "Chance in History." pp. 221. 225. 226.

4. Halder. Diiaries. vol. 6, p. 104, entry for 7 May 41. based on the report of the chief of army transportation (Gercke).

5. Philippi and Helm, Feidzug gegen Sowfetnissland, p. 52.

6. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 6. p. 86.

7. Ibid., p. 241.

8. Halder. Dianes, vol. 7, pp. 25, 26.

9. Halder, Diaries, vol. 6. p. 248, and Halder. Diaries, vol. 7. p. 22.

10. See Kdr. d. Elsb. Pi. i. Bid. Hgl. Nord (Stab Eisb. Pi. Egt. 3). Bericht. c. 24.8.1941. U.S. National Archives, German Records, Headquarters. German Army High Command, Microcopy T-78, Roll 117. Fr. 6041126.

11. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 6. p. 12.

12. Note Bock, Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. 4. entry for 25 June 1941. in which he notes. "The railway led already by today . . . up to 80 km east of Brest-a very substantial relief for the overloaded supply routes of Panzer Group Guderian."

13. See OKH, General der Eisenbahatruppen. Ausschnitte bus der Lagemeldung. Gru-kodeis. Mitte 1941. U.S. National Archives, Records Headquarters German Army High Command, Microcopy T-78. Roll 113. Frs. 6035897. 6035898.

14. The additional track would comprise a substantial 15 percent over and above the track constructed among cities. See, for example, the mileages in Gen. d. Eisb. Tr. Aus-schnitte. Stand derStreckenwederherstellung. 1941-1942. U.S. NationalArchives. Records. German Army High Command. Microcopy T-78, Roll 117. Fr. 6041049.

15. Eisenbahntruppen. U.S. National Archives, German Army High Command. Microcopy, T-78. Roll 113, Fr. 6035898. See also Bock. Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. 13.

16. See Halder. Diaries, vol. 6, p. 241.

17. Note the use of the rail system through Orsha. Vitebsk, and Smolensk in the first half of August 1941 in Generalma)or Windisch, Personal Diary of the German 9th Army Supply Officer {German Language Copy) (from 1.8.1941-31.1.1942Л5 February 1954), p. 7. U.S. Army, European Command, Historical Division, MS P-201.

18. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 248. in which fourteen trains are noted as available for Army Group Center as of 18 July 1941, and Halder. Diaries, vol. 7. pp. 25. 26, in which twenty-four trains daily are noted as running to supply the center after 7 August 1941.

19. As early as 12 July 1941, the quartermaster general of the German army noted in a telephone call to the chief of staff that Army Group Center had enough supplies to maintain an armored drive to Moscow. He also notes that the infantry had only enough to get to Smolensk. It follows that as early as 12 July, the Germans were close to having logistics under control for a push almost straight through to Moscow. See Halder. Diaries, vol. 6. p. 231.

Chapter Twelve

1. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 7, p. 22, where Generalmajor Eduard Wagner, notes train arrivals in Army Group Center totalling twenty-four and twenty-six each on 4 and 5 August 1941. respectively.

2. See Oberkommando des Heeres. Gen. St. d. H.. Op. Abt.. Nr. 1401/41 g. Kdos. Chefs. den 28Juli 1941. Ausfertigungen. Weisung. fur die Fortfuhrung der Operationen, Anlage 1. Feindlage. U.S. National Archives, Records Headquarters German Army High Command, Copy T-78. Roll 335, Fr. 621729.

3. See Combat In the East. Experiences of German Tactical and Logistical Units in Russia (1952). p. 58. U.S. Army, European Command. Historical Division. MS B-266.

4. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 7, p. 5, entry for I August 1941, which shows a ratio of three German to two Soviet divisions In combat in the area of Army Group North.

5. Generalmajor Detlev von Plato, interview, Grabow, FRG, 25 January 1980. Plato was lb (logistics officer) of 1st Panzer Division attacking In the Baltic. He noted that the division did not encounter a single road with either bituminous or concrete surfacing. The best road was that connecting Ostrow with Pleskau in Latvia, "surfaced" with broken stone-that is, a gravel road. These statements and similar ones by other Barbarossa veterans have led me to the conclusion that there were virtually no roads in the Soviet Union in 1941 with bituminous or concrete surfacing.

6. The city of Batum. near the Turkish border In Gruzinskaya SSR, was larger under special counting of urban settlements close to the city and under control of the city Soviet. Batum was significantly smaller under the ordinary system applied to virtually all the other cities in the USSR.

7. See Munzel, Panzer-Taktik, for the general possibilities In such a tactic.

Chapter Thirteen

1. See Keitel, In the Service of the Relch. pp. 28. 29, as summarized by the editor, Walter Goerlitz.

2. See U.S. Army, German Campaign Russia, 1940-1942. p. 59, in which the monograph notes that "the conflict over the continuation of operations became acute when Hitler overrode all his advisors-except Keitel-and Imposed Directive No. 33 . . . upon the Army." 3. Halder, Diaries, vol. 3. p. 35. See also p. 30. where Hitler complains that the "enemy reacted in the past drastically and with promptness" to German moves toward the border. He notes that a new system of assembly and probably a whole new plan of attack were required.

4. See Suvorov, "Who Was Planning to Attack Whom?" pp. 50-55.

5. See Generalkommando XI. A.K. lc. Qu.. den 22.9.1941. U.S. National Archives, Records German Field Commands, Panzer Armies. Microcopy Т-31Э. Roll II. Fr. 7237777. in which a Soviet attack against Romania is noted In a prisoner Interrogation report as having been planned for autumn 1941.

6. Groeben. Interview. Celle-Boye. FRG, Jan 80.

7. The Crimea was not noted for its economic resources. It was a potential air base for Soviet bombers dangerously dose to the Romanian oil fields.

8. Hitler. Mein Kampf. pp. 264-66.

9. Taylor, March of Conquest, p. 158.

10. Manstein, Lost Victories, pp. 83-126. In an Impressive, detailed analysis, Manstein describes the development of strategy and plan for the war in the west but does not mention Hitler's fundamental personal fear of the Allied seizure of Belgium.

11.. See Mrazek Fall ofEban Emael, pp. 31-33. The work is an impressive monograph based on primary sources.

12. Langer, The Mind ofAdolfHitler.

13. Halder, Diaries, vol. 4. p. 15, entry for 17 May 1940.

14. See for example, Edwards. German Airborne Troops, p. 96.

15. Guderian. Panzer Leader, p. 30.

16. See English translation in Trevor-Roper, Hitler's War Directives, p. 49. For the German original see International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 48.

17. See Beprechung {sic} an 29. November 1941. 1200-1400 Ohi. Ort: Relchskanziei. Teilnehmer: Der Filhrer . . . Keitel .. . Grund der Besprechung: Panzerwagenverteidigung {sic} und Panzerabwehr. Document collection of the^author.

Chapter Fourteen

1.In the more general literature on World War II. the view predominates, implied or expressed, that the tide turned with the/ German disaster at Stalingrad. See, for example, Langer. An Encyclopedia of World Histofy. p. 1143; Falls, A Hundred Years of War. pp. 369, 370; and Liddell Hart. History of the Second World War. pp. 260-64. In the more specialized literature, see. for example, the ultra-decisive remarks in Alan Clark. Baibarossa. the Russian-German Conflict. J94J-45(New York: William Morrow. 1965). p. 248. and Ziemke. Stalingrad to Berlin, p. ix, the latter presenting the chapter entitled: "Stalingrad, the Turning Point." Note also E. K. G. Sixsmith. "Stalin's War with Germany." Journal of the Royal United Services Institute {or Defence Studies 120. no. 3 (1975): 80.

2. From the Soviet interpretation in Deborin. Second World War. p. 285.

3. Ibid. See also lvanov, "Stalingradskaia Bitva," pp. 3-20, in which the statement stands out: "The battle for Stalingrad, the most important battle of World War II, showed the heroism of the Soviet army. The title of the article can be translated as "The Battle for Stalingrad and its International Significance."

4. See Falls, Second World War. pp. 137. 138, in which the western author emphasizes the special importance of Stalingrad.

5. See, for example, Kozlov and Olsen, "La Bataille de Kursk." pp. 144-64, in which the thesis is expressed that the Soviet victory at the battle of Kursk in July and August 1943 was the turning point of the Second World War.

6. Deborin. Second World War. p. 285. makes the claim that "the Volga battle was the greatest of all the battles on the Soviet-German front." The claim contradicts similar Soviet claims made for Kursk and runs afoul of the German victories at Blalystok. Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev, and Vyasma-Bryansk during Barbarossa, which were of comparable or greater dimensions.

7. See, for example, Frankland and Dowling. Decisive Battles of the Twentieth Century. p. 221.

8. Deborin. Second World War. p. 285.

9. See In Renato Verna. "Front e Russo 1943," 24 (4): 437-54 and 24 (5): 536-49. in which the author argues in favor of Kursk as the battle that finally tipped the balance between the German and Soviet armed forces in the east.

10. See the interesting terms used several times In Ministerialrat Helmuth Greiner, Africa. 1941 (February 1946), pp. 1-16, U.S. Army, European Command, Historical Division. MS# C-065f. to describe the way in which the German motorized force would be employed in North Africa in 1941.

11.. Even Punch, or the London Charivari. 12 July 1905. shows a somewhat unfair attitude on the part of the British and French In Its large lithograph entitled. "Not in the Picture," showing the kaiser dressed as a German sailor being excluded from a photograph about to be taken of a British and a French sailor.

12. See Tank Industry Report. Exhibit A, facing p. 20. U.S.. Strategic Bombing Survey. in which German production totals 1,368 tanks and assault guns and Czech production under German control totals 275 Czech 385 tanks. See Aircraft Industry Report. Exhibit 3. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, which shows German production of combat aircraft as 7,103 bombers and fighters for 1940 and an additional 3.268 transport, trainer, and "other" aircraft-a total of 10,371 engined military aircraft.

13. See Hancock, History of the Second World War. pp. 176, 185. 484.

14. See Tank Industry Report. Exhibit A, facing p. 20. U.S., Strategic Bombing Survey, In which German production totals 19,226 armored vehicles, including tanks, tank destroyers. assault guns, and self-propelled guns.

Bibliography