Our U-Boats and their Method of Warfare
IN the year 1916, up to the time of the Battle of the Skagerrak, the following additions had been made to the U-boat fleet: 38 large U-boats, 7 large submarine minelayers, 34 U-B-boats. Two large submarine minelayers, 3 U-B-boats and 3 U-C-boats had still to undergo steam trials; 53 large U-boats, 10 large submarine minelayers, 27 U-B-boats and 66 U-C-boats were under construction. Since the outbreak of war we had lost 21 large U-boats, 1 large submarine minelayer, 6 U-B-boats, 7 U-C-boats, and 2 U-B-boats had been handed over to the Bulgarian Government. The distribution of all the U-boats was so arranged that half were under the orders of the Admirals of the Fleet, and of the rest one half were stationed in the Mediterranean, while the other half, the last quarter, were assigned to the Naval Corps in Flanders. For the sake of quick construction the new types of so-called "U-B "-boats and " U-C "-boats had been introduced, in addition to the main type of large U-boats similar to "U 19," the first one fitted with Diesel engines.
The chief characteristics of the different types were as follows:
"U 19," surface displacement, 650 tons; highest speed on the surface, 12 knots; under water, 9 knots; number of torpedoes, 9, of 50 cm. calibre. Improvements were made in the type. From " U 40 " onwards the displacement was raised first to 700 tons, and from "U 80 " onwards to 800 tons, the speed was raised to 17 knots on the surface, the number of torpedoes increased to 12, and from "U 90 " onwards to 16. The torpedo of 50 cm. calibre had an explosive charge of 200 kilos. The first large submarine minelayers were not armed with torpedoes. They had a displacement of 760 tons, a surface speed of 9.5 knots, and under water 7.5 knots; they carried 34 to 36 mines.
Of the U-B-boats, at first a small number with a displacement of 125 tons was built for use in Flanders, with four torpedoes, speed of 8.5 knots on the surface and 5.5 knots under water. The U-B-boat was then enlarged to 500 tons, with a speed on the surface of 12.5 knots and of 7 under water.
The U-C-boats were of a type designed both for minelaying and firing torpedoes. At first only a small number of these was built, with a displacement of 150 tons; ultimately the boats had a displacement of 400 tons, speed of 11 knots on the surface and 6.5 under water. They carried 18 mines and could take four torpedoes.
At the beginning the U-boats were armed with one 5 cm. gun as a defence against enemy submarines. But as their use was developed in the war, such various demands were made upon them that their armament had to be increased. One or two guns of 8.8 cm. were placed on the U-boats, U-B-boats, and the U-C-boats; the submarine cruisers were in part armed with a gun of 15 cm. calibre.
The majority of the large U-boats was assigned to the Fleet for use in the blockaded area west of England. The length of their trips was 21 to 28 days, but this was also dependent on the amount of ammunition used when the boats had found a favourable opportunity to fire their torpedoes soon after leaving port. The big minelayers were also under the command of the Fleet, and could be sent on distant expeditions—to the White Sea or to the Mediterranean.
The U-B-boats, being rather smaller, had proved to be very handy and quickly submersible, although they could not remain so long at sea. They were, therefore, mainly assigned to the base in Flanders, as were the U-C-boats, of which a small number, however, was at the disposal of the Fleet and used for laying mines on the east coast of England. The distribution of the boats among the various bases was carried out according to the facilities the latter had for repairing the boats on their return from expeditions. The large amount of technical apparatus in a U-boat required very careful overhauling and repair on her return from an expedition; also the damage due to the voyage or to enemy attacks had to be repaired. Generally speaking, after four weeks at sea a boat would need to lie in the dockyard for the same length of time for repairs. The Imperial dockyard at Wilhelmshaven had been enlarged and was the chief place to which the U-boats of the Fleet were sent for repair. The docks at Kiel and Danzig were needed for other purposes; the bases at Zeebrugge and Pola were used at first mainly for overhauling the boats. Until these dockyards had been altered so as to be able to undertake more extensive work the boats which belonged there had to return home for important repairs.
When the U-boat campaign was opened on February 1, 1917, there were 57 boats already in the North Sea. The officer commanding the Baltic district had eight assigned to him, the Naval Corps in Flanders had at its disposal 38, and the stations in the Mediterranean 31 U-boats of different types. The favourable experiences of the commercial U-boat U-Deutschland had led to the construction of U-cruisers, of which the first series had a displacement of 1,200 tons, which was later on raised to 2,000 and more. When they could no longer be used for trade purposes the commercial U-boats were taken over by the Navy and altered for use as warships. They were fitted with two guns of 15 cm. calibre and two torpedo tubes, and could carry about 30 torpedoes in accordance with the extended period during which they could be used on cruises, cruises which reached as far as the Azores and lasted up to three months. With this fleet of U-boats the Navy was well equipped to do justice to the task assigned to it, although England had used the whole of 1916 to develop her defence. The sinkings of the year 1917 prove this. They were:
| 1917 | |
| February, | 781,500 tons |
| March, | 885,000 tons |
| April, | 1,091,000 tons |
| May, | 869,000 tons |
| June, | 1,016,000 tons |
| July, | 811,000 tons |
| August, | 808,000 tons |
| September, | 672,000 tons |
| October, | 674,000 tons |
| November, | 607,000 tons |
| December, | 702,000 tons |
| 1918 | |
| January, | 632,000 tons |
| February, | 680,000 tons |
| March, | 689,000 tons |
| April, | 652,000 tons |
| May, | 614,000 tons |
| June, | 521,000 tons |
| July, | 550,000 tons |
| August, | 420,000 tons |
| September, | 440,000 tons |
The enemy's defence consisted, firstly, in directly combating the U-boats, and, secondly, in special measures which England adopted to counterbalance the loss of tonnage. The first impediment our U-boats had to overcome—I am speaking of the activities of the U-boats assigned to the Fleet (the same applies to the Flanders boats), whereas those in the Mediterranean mostly worked under less difficult conditions—lay in the minefields blocking the North Sea. To deal successfully with these the Fleet had had to create a special organisation. In addition to the actual mine-sweepers, whose work it was to keep certain paths through the belt of mines clear, special convoying flotillas had been formed, fitted with minesweeping apparatus, which accompanied the U-boats along the routes that had been cleared, till they reached the open sea, and met them at the same spot on their return from their fields of operation to take them safely home again. When attacking steamers the boats had to reckon with their armament, for in spite of the large number of guns required and the crews to man them, nearly the whole of the English Merchant Fleet—at any rate all the more valuable steamers—was armed.
As a further defence, besides the destroyers which were excellently suited to this purpose and were armed with depth charges, a large number of new kinds of boats with shallow draft had been built especially to combat the U-boats. Nets and all sorts of wire entanglements hindered the U-boats in their work near the English coast. The so-called "Q "-boats, intended to serve as traps for submarines, were specially fitted out; they presented the appearance of neutral ships, and on the approach of the U-boat let fall their disguise and attempted to destroy it with guns and explosives. The practice of gathering considerable numbers of British merchantmen together and convoying them added greatly to the difficulties the U-boat encountered in achieving success; these ships were protected according to their size and value either by light craft or by bigger warships.
During the first months of the U-boat campaign I never missed an opportunity of hearing the story of his experiences and adventures direct from the lips of the commander of a returning U-boat; and thus I had opportunity to form an idea of the perseverance, courage and resolution of these young officers who won my highest admiration for the seamanship and the calm intrepidity, which they succeeded in communicating to the crew as well. It is a splendid testimonial to the spirit of the Navy that all who could possibly be considered suitable for the U-boat service, both officers and men, rushed to offer themselves. Even older Staff officers, in spite of their many years of service, begged to be taken as commanders of U-boats, even if they had to serve under a flotilla commander younger than themselves.
The three half-flotillas into which the U-boats of the Fleet lied been formed at the beginning of the war developed in time into four flotillas. Their commanders were: First U-Flotilla, Commander Pasgnay; Second U-Flotilla, Commander von Rosenberg; Third U-Flotilla, Lieutenant-Commander Forstmann (Walter); Fourth U-Flotilla, Commander Pranse. I should like to mention in connection with these Lieutenant-Commander Bartenbach, who was at the head of the U-flotilla in Flanders, who so often supported the enterprises of the Fleet with his boats. In an exemplary manner, despite all obstacles, he directed the difficult operations of the Flanders boats, against which the British defence was particularly heavy. All who served with him were animated by a spirit of comradeship and readiness for action, which had the most refreshing and grateful effect upon anyone who spent any time with them.
The Chief Director of the U-boats under the command of the Fleet was Captain Bauer; he himself took part in the fighting expeditions of the U-boats in the blockaded area round England, in order to be able to form his own opinion of the circumstances in which the boats under his command had to operate. It is his great merit that he recognised the capacity of the U-boat and brought it to that degree of efficiency to which its later successes are due. When, later on, owing to the increasing activity in construction, the number of U-boats grew to such an extent that their organisation far surpassed that required for a squadron and demanded a corresponding increase in authority, Commodore Michelsen, who had hitherto commanded the torpedo-boats, was placed at the head. His great knowledge and experience of the department of torpedoes designated him as particularly suitable for this post, and he completely fulfilled all expectations in this respect.
The U-boat service was the one which suffered the heaviest losses of the Navy; the number of boats lost on fighting expeditions amounted to 50 per cent. Altogether 360 U-boats and U-boat cruisers were employed in the U-boat campaign, of which 184 were lost in the course of their enterprises. This high percentage of losses was for the most part due to the defence of the enemy, which grew more and more vigorous, as he tried to get the better of the U-boat danger by the use of all sorts of dodges and methods; yet a large proportion is ascribable to the fact that our U-boat commanders could not resist the temptation, when sinking a steamer, to save the lives of those on board as far as possible, even though they so often met with disappointment.
I should like to illustrate the difficulties encountered by our U-boats by a few instances, quoting the official reports concerning them. But it would be impossible to do all the commanders equal justice, for they vied with each other in meeting the dangers which their difficult business involved, and with which the public are already familiar through various popular writings.
The journey to America of the "U 53 " is a splendid testimonial to the perseverance of the crew and the high quality of the material. On September 11 this U-boat received orders to lie off the American coast about the time when the U-merchant boat Bremen was expected to arrive at New London (North America), in order to search for and attack enemy ships which, in all probability, would be waiting there for the submarine merchantman. After completing this task, the boat was to call at Newport, Rhode Island, but was to leave again after a few hours at most, so as to give the American authorities no excuse or occasion to detain her. There was to be no replenishment of supplies, with the possible exception of fresh victuals. If no enemy warships were met with, she was to carry on commercial war according to Prize Law off the American coast.
On September 17 the boat started on her outward voyage from Heligoland. In the North Sea she had very heavy weather. There was a S.S.W. gale and such high seas that the men on watch on the conning tower of the boat were up to their necks in water all the time.
The supplies of the boat had had to be increased so as to make the voyage possible. Four ballast tanks were altered for use as fuel tanks, so that the oil supply was increased from 90 cb. m. to 150 cb. m.; the supply of lubricating oil of, 14½ cb. m. was considered sufficient for the voyage. Added to this, there was the increase in fresh water and food supplies, so that the boat's draught was increased by 40 c.m. So far as her sea-going qualities were concerned, her commander reported that the boat rode very steadily on the whole, but that every sea went over her upper deck, even when the force of the wind was only 4; from almost every direction spray flew over the bridge. Consequently for those on duty on the bridge, the voyage, especially at first, was a tremendous strain. The commander did not think that the officers and petty officers would be able to stand it (the rubber suits that had to be worn almost daily for the first fortnight were not watertight), and he would have turned back if the weather had not improved soon after September 24.
The route for the voyage out had been chosen to run from the most northerly point of the Shetland Islands, which they passed on September 20, straight to the Newfoundland Bank, so as to remain on the northern side of the usual belt of low barometric pressure. Weather conditions were uncertain and changeable. There was often a very high and very steep swell, in which the boat pitched heavily. They, however, experienced following winds nearly all the time, which were favourable for journey. After reaching the Newfoundland Bank, the boat, was carried vigorously to the west by the Labrador current. On the whole the health of the crew was good, until they were nearing Newfoundland Bank. Then a number were attacked with headache and sickness, which is said to be a common occurrence in these parts.
On October 7 the boat lay before Long Island Sound. No war ships were encountered. At 3 P.M. the commander entered the harbour of Newport, Rhode Island, accompanied by an American submarine, which had joined him on the way, and there he paid official visits to Admiral Knight and the commander of torpedoboats, Admiral Gleaves. He wrote in his diary:
"The former received me very coolly, and said that the Bremen, as far as he knew, had been sighted about 10 days before between Newfoundland and New York. [That was not correct, as the Bremen never reached America.] Admiral Knight obviously thought it most desirable that the ' U 53 ' should leave again the same evening. If I had not announced that such was my intention, I think I should have been given a pretty broad hint on the subject."Admiral Gleaves was very friendly and much interested; he inquired about all particulars of the voyage. The adjutants of both admirals returned my visit. At 4.30 P.M. Admiral Gleaves himself came to inspect the boat. I took him over her, as, earlier in the day, I had done several young officers. More than anything else the Diesel engines roused envious admiration. Many officers came on board with their ladies, as did civilians, reporters, and one photographer. The crew received all sorts of little presents. At 5.30 P.M. we weighed anchor. Proceeded to sea at 6.30 P.M. Trial dive. Course, Nantucket Lightship; 270 revolutions equivalent to 9 knots."
Nantucket Lightship was reached on October 8 at 5.30 A.M, Very clear, calm weather prevailed. The commander decided to examine the merchant traffic outside territorial waters and to wage cruiser warfare.
At this meeting-point of so many trade routes, the boat was able to stop seven steamers in the course of the day, and after the crews had in every case left the ship, she sank the British steamer Strathdene from Glasgow (4,321 tons), the Norwegian steamer Chr. Knutsen (3,378 tons) with gasolene destined for London, the British steamer Westpoint (3,847 tons), the Dutch steamer Blommersdyk (4,850 tons), whose whole cargo consisted of absolute and conditional contraband. According to an American certificate, the Blommersdyk, before reaching her destination, was to call at Kirkwall (in the Orkney Islands, a British examining station for merchant steamer traffic). In his log the commander reports as follows:
"Meanwhile, in this narrow space besides the two steamers— there was an English passenger boat as well, the Stefano, from Liverpool, 3,449 tons, which had already been stopped and was disembarking her crew—and the ' U 53 ' sixteen American destroyers had assembled, so that we had to manœuvre with the greatest care. While I was towing back the boat of the Blommersdyk, which had brought the officer with her papers, ' U 53 ' got so near an American destroyer that we had to reverse with both engines to avoid a collision. We cleared one another by about 50 m. When reversing, I cast my tow loose, and her crew did not return to the Blommersdyk at all, but went straight on board a destroyer. I had told the officer that the crew would be given twenty-five minutes in which to disembark —till 6.30 P.M. To make sure that no one should be hurt, he was to haul down his flag to show that no one was left on board. Then I approached the passenger steamer to examine her papers, or, in case she had not yet lowered a boat, to dismiss her forthwith out of consideration for the passengers. I had already given orders for the signal, ' You can proceed,' when I realised that the steamer had been abandoned and all on board accommodated on an American destroyer. I then returned to the Blommersdyk. By means of a siren and calling through a megaphone I made sure that no one was left on board. A destroyer which lay very near the steamer was asked by Morse signal to move away a little, so that the ship might be sunk. This the destroyer did at once. Hit with torpedo, a depth of 4 m. in hold 4. The steamer was then sunk by a second torpedo."
The passenger steamer Stefano was then also sunk. At 10.30 P.M. the boat began her return voyage. Though it would have been very desirable to extend our activities off the American coast as long as possible, yet any further delay would have endangered the whole enterprise because of the fuel supply; for during the short stay at Newport, the boat, in accordance with the general instructions issued to her, had taken in no supplies of any kind. For the return voyage we counted on a consumption of fuel of 60 cb. m., and a certain reserve was allowed in the event of head winds and storms. That this precaution was necessary is proved by the fact that although the weather as far as the Shetlands was very favourable, the boat arrived at Heligoland with only 14.5 cb.m. of fuel. For the return voyage the longer route via Fastnet Rock was chosen. In so doing, the unsettled weather conditions that had been encountered in the higher latitudes on the voyage out were avoided; also on this southern side of the belt of low barometric pressure there was less fear of head winds than in the north. After waiting twenty hours at the S.E. corner of the Newfoundland Bank to weather a storm, the boat proceeded with little delay as far as the Hebrides, passing through an area of high pressure (770 mm.) accompanied by a steady west wind. The route then followed was round the Shetland Islands. On October 28, at 3 P.M., the boat entered the harbour at Heligoland. It had covered a distance of 7,550 sea miles and had only stopped once for two and a half hours in Newport. When the boat arrived at Wilhelmshaven next day, I was able to assure myself by personal observation that all her crew were in excellent condition. They might well be proud of their eminent, seaman-like, and technical achievement.
Let us follow this same Lieut.-Commander Rose on his "U 53 " on a cruise, during which he waged war according to Prize Law, as still had to be done in January, in pursuance of the instructions issued, before the introduction of the unrestricted U-boat campaign. I will quote his log, omitting what is not of general interest:—
"January 20th, 1917.—Left Heligoland. Wind east, force 8, cloudless, clear. Route via Terschelling Lightship to Nordhinder Lightship."January 21st. — Sank to the bottom, 38 m. Conversation (by submarine telephone) with ' U 55.' 6.30 P.M., dark, starless night, wind east, 3-4. Started on normal course.
"January 22nd. —11 A.M. Sank French sailing ship Anna (150 gr.t.) by thirteen rounds of gun-fire; cargo, road-metalling. 9 P.M., South of Lizard Head. ' U 55 ' reports station. As the presence of U-boats in the Channel is thereby betrayed, tried to report on own station and intentions (valuable for 'U 55 '). Immediately after heard very loud British convoy signals and then the warning, ' German submarine 37 miles south of Lizard.' That could only apply to ' U 53.' 11.40 P.M., south of the Wolf Rock, two ships with many lights, little way, and changing courses at a distance of about 6 sea miles from one another. Apparently guiding ships to show entrance to Channel. After prolonged observation, steered west between the two.
"January 23, 12.5 A.M.—A big cargo steamer approaching with a course of 90 degrees. At some distance behind several lights; probably one of the expected convoys. Two officers of mercantile marine who are on board think the ship to be British of about 4,500 gr.t. She is fully laden. Started attack on surface. At first attempt a miss, at second a hit, port amidships. The steamer stops, sinks lower, gets a list, keeps on burning blue lights, then lowers boats. Left soon as further action impossible. Did not observe the sinking of the badly damaged ship. Passed several guardships with different lights. One of them on a course towards the scene of disaster. Let her searchlight play there for a short time. The guiding ships have gone on or put out their lights.
"6.40 A.M.—A steamer with bright lights and funnels lit up steers a zigzag course. She seems to be waiting. Sent Morse message to steamer in English. She is Dutch, with oilcake for Rotterdam. Dismissed steamer before dawn.
"2 P.M.—Avoided a ' Foxglove ' (new type of British U-boat chaser) and the steamer accompanying it.
" 11 P.M.—Avoided a guardship. She carried steamer lights on forestay to appear bigger.
"January 24, —12 midnight. A smaller steamer, arranged for carrying passengers, steers 200 degrees. Flag illuminated, but not recognisable. Obviously a neutral. Sheered off.
" 7 A.M.—A steamer, course 250 degrees, approached, pretending to be a French outpost ship. She is a neutral tank steamer. Sheered off.
"8.30 A.M.—Wind east, but swell; cloudy in parts, visibility good. Dived on account of an airship approaching from the east; it may be a captive balloon broken loose. Voyage under water to the neighbourhood of Ushant (French island at the western end of the Channel).
" 2 P.M.—Wind east, force 7-8. Rose to surface.
"3.15 P.M.—Small sailing ship in sight in southerly direction. Owing to high seas, no opportunity to attack.
" 10 P.M.—Wind east, 6-7, swell. Absolutely impossible to fire at night. A lot of water comes over. Dived. Voyage to presumptive meeting place near Ushant.
"January 25, 6.30 A.M.—Wind south-east, force 7-8, position Ushant, 50 sea miles to east. Hove to. Waiting off Ushant. A small sailing ship about 30 sea miles west of Ushant. Left her unmolested because of heavy sea. Not possible to fire at night because of high seas. Visibility bad, therefore dived for night journey.
"January 26. —Weather unchanged. Dived for night journey.
"January 27, 3 A.M.—Wind east, force 8. Visibility bad. Snow from 11 A.M. Boat rolls more and more. Depth 34 m. Position not fixed. Stood out to sea at low speed.
5 P.M.—North of Ushant. Wind, force 10, swell. Sighted large steamer of about 200 tons, so far as can be seen, armed fore and aft. Gave way, as impossible to fire at the time and no improvement in weather to be expected for next few hours. Steamer going slow; was painted grey. Apparently one of bigger guardships. Dived for night journey.
"January 28, 8 A.M.—Came to surface north of Ushant. Wind E.S.E., force 6.
"6.30 P.M.—Inspected Spanish steamer Nueva Montana, of Santander, 2,000 gr.t., from under water, then stopped her with shot. Cargo, iron ore to Newcastle. Crew on board took boats in tow. Set fire to three explosive bombs in engine-room. Steamer sinks slowly, deeper and deeper. As all buoyancy chambers are connected, her sinking only a matter of time. When last seen, the swell was pouring over the after part of the ship. Took crew as far as 12 sea miles west of Ushant; left boats there.
"January 29, 7 A.M.—Danish steamer Copenhagen, cargo, coal from Newcastle to Huelva. Examined and dismissed.
"6 P.M.—Steamer Algorta, 2,100 gr.t., from Segund with iron ore for Stockton. Inspected from under water, then stopped by shot. Took crew in tow. Sank steamer with four explosive bombs.
"10.15 P.M.—Cast off boats in neighbourhood of medium-sized steamer steering about 240 degrees. Called up steamer by star shell.
" January 30. —Course, 340 degrees. Intend activity for next two days in neighbourhood of Scilly Isles. Nothing in sight. At dusk, south of Scilly Isles, steamed on towards Lizard, distance 8 sea miles. Encountered no commercial traffic, only guardships southwest and west of the Scillys.
"January 31, 9 A.M.—Stopped Dutch steamer Boomberg, about 1,600 gr.t. Coal from Cardiff for Las Palmas; dismissed her.
" 10 A.M.—Stopped Spanish steamer Lorida, about 1,600 gr.t Cargo, coal from Cardiff to Cadiz. Dismissed her.
"2.30 P.M.—Stopped Norwegian steamer Hickla, 524 gr.t. Cargo, pit props for Cardiff. Set steamer on fire. Crew sails for Scilly Islands.
"5.30 P.M.—Stopped a smallish steamer, steering 175 degrees, coming from astern. Steamer returns fire at 80 hectometres from gun of at least 8 cm. calibre. Her shots fall short, but are well aimed.
"6 P.M.—Ceased gunfire after about forty rounds. Distance increased to bounds of visibility, then tried to keep touch at full speed. In dusk steamer gets out of sight and cannot be found again.
" 11.50 P.M.—Weather calmer, bright moon. Clear. Stopped Danish motor-boat Falstria, about 4,000 gr.t., from Far East via Dartmouth. Ship in order; ship dismissed.
"February 1. —West of Ushant. Steamed all day over field of search; nothing in sight.
"February 2, 5 A.M.—Attacked with bronze torpedo a large fully laden steamer, about 2,000 t., steering 170 degrees. No marks of neutrality. Hit amidships. Steamer stops; lights go out. No movement or work discernible on deck. After half an hour steamer still afloat. Will probably sink, as she is badly damaged.
"4 P.M.—Near Bishop Rock stopped a French old square-rigged schooner, Anna Maria, from St. Malo, about 150 gr.t., by using signal ' Abandon ship.' After a time the mate came on board in a little rowing boat without a keel. The crew try with boots and cups to keep the boat more or less dry. In consideration of the impossibility of rescuing the crew in this boat, the ship was allowed to continue her journey. The mate gave a written promise in the name of the crew not to go to sea any more during this war. The cargo of the ship consisted of salt and wine.
"February 3. —West of the Scillys. Wind east, force 2. 8 A.M., stopped Norwegian steamer Rio de Janeiro, 2,800 gr.t. Wheat, linseed, oil cakes, tan for Copenhagen and Christiana. Steamer dismissed.
" 11 A.M.—Submarine attack on American steamer Housatonic, 2,443 t. Then rose to surface and stopped steamer. Cargo 3,862 tons of wheat from New York for London. Fired bronze torpedo from first tube to sink steamer. The torpedo slips half out of the tube without leaving it. It starts to go, and we can hear the engine running slowly. The boat is stopped. Watertight doors closed. After some time detonation under the boat, without any turmoil of water or column of smoke. The torpedo has left the tube and obviously sunk and exploded at the bottom, at a depth of 110 m. A few rising air bubbles indicate that the airchamber must have separated owing to pressure as the depth of water increased. Steamer sunk by bronze torpedo from 4th tube. Took boats in tow and handed them over to a guardship which was called up by two shots. When retreating from the guardship, which came up at once, we met ' U 60.' ' U 60 ' dives. I intend to draw the guardship past ' U 60.' Guardship sheers off, rescues crew of American boats which ' U 53 ' asked her by wireless to do. ' U 60' dives. Exchange of reports with ' U 60.'
"February 4, 12.5 A.M.—With gunfire and explosive bombs sank French barque Aimée Marie, from St. Servant, 327 gr.t.; cargo, salt and wine for home port. Crew rows to Scilly Isles. Owing to the extraordinary lightness of the night, avoided darkened guardships. Meeting and exchange of reports with ' U 83.'
10 A.M.—Sank with two explosive bombs schooner Bangpuhtis, from Windau, 259 gr. t., and ballast from St. Nazaire for Cardiff. Crew sails for Scilly Islands.
"4 P.M.—Examined Norwegian three-master Manicia, 1,800 gr.t., from Rosano with linseed for Rotterdam, and dismissed her. Ship at sea since December 1.
" February 5, 12.30 A.M.—Wind east, estimated force, 5-6. Surface attack on steamer on which all except navigating lights are out, no lights as distinguishing marks, estimated at 3,000 gr.t. Armament cannot be discerned. On attacking became convinced that size of steamer has been over-estimated. When sheering off recognise Swedish distinguishing marks. Stop steamer by white star-shell and Morse lamp signals. Steamer answers no signal and makes no other sign. After a time steams at full speed out to sea. Stopped anew by two shots. She does not answer Morse signals. Circled round steamer till dawn. By daylight found she was steamer Bravalla, 1,519 gr.t. By flag-signals she announced her port of destination as Liverpool, cargo, nuts. If sunk at that spot crew would have been lost. Impossible to tow boats owing to high seas. Therefore gave steamer signal ' Follow.' Further signals giving exact instructions as to behaviour when ship was to be sunk later on, were cut off because as soon as she understood the first words ' I am going to sink you,' she hauled down the answering signal and took no further notice. On the way I had to force the steamer to obedience again, as she tried to sheer off. The sea gradually decreases. Shelter owing to neighbourhood of land perceptible. A guardship is sighted. Signal to Bravalla, ' Abandon ship.' She does nothing. Not till four minutes later, when the gun is trained on her, does she hoist the answering signal. A shot before her bows, then one in her forecastle. Steamer lowers boats. Ceased fire. When the boats had hove to, opened fire again. Difficult to aim owing to rolling of boat and target. There is a very heavy hail squall. Steamer hit several times, but does not sink. Although no one is left on board the engines keep going with fewer revolutions. Guardship approaches to a distance of about 40 hectometres, opens fire: dived. Sank steamer by a torpedo, guardship meanwhile rescued Swedish crew."
And so on. These extracts should suffice to show under what difficulties the boats worked so long as they had to consider the neutrality of steamers, and it also shows how many opportunities for sinking ships in the blockaded areas were lost.
To illustrate other kinds of U-boat activities in the restricted U-boat campaign, we will quote from other logs. The first extract is from the log of a U-C-boat that had orders to lay mines along the east coast of England.
"December 13, 1916.—Various vessels to be seen ahead, among them one lying with lights out, which I took to be a destroyer. Dived to avoid danger. Broke through guard-line under water." 9.25 A.M.—Rose to surface. Continued journey on surface. Sighted several steamers which, coming from the south, seemed to be making for the same point as I. It gradually grew very misty, which made it impossible to fix position. Presumed we were near land, as the sea grew calm, the water was dirty yellow in colour, and there was a strong smell of coal dust. After diving quickly several times to avoid steamers, continued under water 270 degrees (course west).
" 1 P.M.—Sighted strong, surf on starboard bow. A wall was dimly visible above, and over that a big factory, with several chimneys. At the same time the boat touched the bottom at 10 m. Reversed course, and as I was quite uncertain of ship's position, resolved to rise to surface to get my bearings above water. Hardly opened hatch of conning tower when I see about 600 m. to port at 2.14 P.M. a large destroyer with three funnels and two masts, passing at about 20 knots on a course N.N.W. She seemed to have appeared quite suddenly out of the mist and not to have seen me yet. Dived to 16 m.
"2.20 P.M. —As many steamers were in sight and visibility still bad, gave up intention of finding ship's position. Lay at the bottom, 23 m. water. Boat lay very unsteady; repeatedly heard the noise of screws above me.
"5 P.M.—Dusk. Northerly swell. Rose to 10 m. As it was getting dark and no ships were to be seen, rose to surface to re-charge and pump in air; stood out to sea a bit.
" 5.42 P.M. Several steamers coming from direction of land towards me. Dived.
"6 P.M.—Very dark night. Rose to surface as darkness had fallen completely. The steamers were coming from west by south. So I concluded that the entrance to the harbour must be in the direction from which they came. The course led towards a darkened light, which now and then sent a ray up vertically. On approaching I see the end of the breakwater. The pilot thought he could recognise this as the entrance to the Tyne. As the night was very dark I decided to go close up to the breakwater. First I made for the northern breakwater; just before reaching it I turned to starboard so as to get a bit farther north. In so doing the boat ran aground north of the northern breakwater. Both engines reversed full steam. Boat slipped off.
"6.42 P.M.—Turned hard-a-starboard to 160. Close to the end of the northern breakwater the first mine dropped. Then turned slowly to starboard so as to get as near as possible to the southern breakwater. When this was in sight at a distance of about 80—100 m., turned sharply, let the last mine fall and stood out to open sea, go degrees (course east)." How much more difficult it was for our U-boats to attack when the steamers travelled in convoys, appears from the following extract from the log of "U 82," commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Hans Adam:
"September 19, 1917, 3.19 P.M.—I shot past the bows of this steamer towards steamers 4 and 5. Steamer 4 I hit. Steamer 2 had hoisted a red flag, which was probably to announce the presence of the boat; for several torpedo-boats make for the steamer. As there was no chance of firing from the only remaining usable tube (stern tube) I dived. The destroyers dropped about 10 depth charges; one burst pretty near the stern. The attack was rendered very difficult by the bad weather, swell, seaway 5 and rain squalls. The success of the attack was due to the excellent steering under water. Made off noiselessly to S.E. under water.
"4.45 P.M.—Rose to surface. I try to come up with the convoy again, as it is still to be seen. But a destroyer forces me under water again.
"6.37 P.M.—Rose to surface. Two destroyers prevent me from steaming up. Owing to heavy seas from S.E. it is impossible to proceed south so as to get ahead of them. Moreover, sea and swell make it impossible to fire a torpedo. Therefore gave up pursuit."
On July 19 and 20, 1918, two of our U-boats encountered a new and valuable steamer, the Justitia, of 32,120 tons, which was very strongly protected on account of its value, and which would accordingly be very difficult to sink. The account of the attacks of the two boats, " U-B 64 " and " U 54," is given below. " U-B 64 " met the steamer on July 19 and damaged her severely, while " U 54 " encountered her the next day when she was being towed into port and finished her off.
As the steamer Justitia, being new, was not on the register on board the U-boat, and the number of such large steamers is small, they thought she was the German steamer Vaterland which the Americans had rechristened Leviathan.
"July 19, 1918. 3.50 P.M.—Two destroyers in sight, course 320 degrees (N.W.). Behind the destroyers a convoy. Boat situated straight before them. Attack prepared for double shot at steamer (3 funnels, 2 masts) situated in the middle of the convoy, which numbers about 12 steamers. Protection by destroyers and submarine chasers in large numbers. Convoy zig-zags. Shortly before the shot the steamer turns towards the boat, therefore only stem shot possible. Distance 350 m.; hit behind the bridge port side."4.33 P.M.—British steamer Justitia, 32,120 tons in ballast. Dived. There follow 35 depth charges, that are well placed.
" 5.20 P.M.—Depth 11m. Steamer has stopped, blows off a lot of steam; apparently hit in boiler or engine. Many destroyers to protect her. Counter course for attack. Destroyers pass over the boat several times.
"6.15 P.M.—Double shot from tubes 1 and 2; distance 2,000 m. Hit midships and astern, port side of steamer, which has stopped. Dived. 23 depth charges which follow immediately on shot.
"7.3 P.M.—Rose to 11 metres depth so as to be able to look through periscope. Steamer has a list to port and is much down by the stern. Started new attack. As destroyers about all the time, cannot show periscope often. In the meantime, the steamer has been towed on a southerly course by large tugs. Steamer towed about 3—4 knots. With course 180 degrees (south) went ahead under water.
"9.48 P.M.—Fired from tube at distance 900 m. Hit on port side. Dived. On a course 0 degrees (north). 11 depth charges. Made off, as battery exhausted.
" 10.33 P.M.—Depth 11 m. Steamer being towed. List has increased, also lies lower in the water.
" 11.23 P.M.—Came to surface. Charged batteries. Reloaded bow tubes with two torpedoes.
"11.50 P.M.—After the four hits, the steamer must undoubtedly go down. It is only a matter of time until the last watertight doors give way. Towing against the sea must make her engine break away soon.
"July 20, 1918.—Before the North Channel (Irish Sea). Kept touch during the night, so as to be sure of observing sinking. As the condition of the steamer grew steadily worse, the course of the tow was altered towards morning to the south for Lough Swilly. Surface attack by night impossible because it was too light.
"4 A.M.—As it was pretty dark and there was a jumble of ships, it was particularly difficult to get in right position for attack. Before ' U-B 64 " was ready to attack, steamer was towed along again. Position very far aft. Steamer lay considerably lower. Batteries not in a condition for me to follow under water.
"5.37 A.M.—Depth of 11 m. Steamer lies athwart with considerably greater list.
"8.40 A.M.—Rose to surface. It could now be ascertained that the depth charges had badly damaged oil bunkers, so that the boat left a broad track of oil. Steamer at the moment out of sight. Wireless messages to boats in the neighbourhood.
"11 A.M.—Steamer sighted to port on course 180 degrees. Hardly possible for her to reach the coast. Steamer with heavy list can barely be moved.
" 11.30 A.M.—Observed two high, clear columns of water, closely following one another, behind steamer; must come from two torpedoes. In boat detonation of 35 depth charges was heard.
" 2.15 P.M .—Steamer sunk. On looking round ascertain that many protecting vessels, with steamer's lifeboats in tow, are making for land. Other craft have rushed to the floating debris. Made off. Many destroyers in pursuit of me." "U 54," which fired two torpedoes at the Justitia on July 20 at 11.20, reports further:
"11.32 A.M.—In the hail of depth charges that became more intense after the detonation of the first torpedo, of course no further detonation could be heard in the boat. After 122, seconds, the petty officer telegraphist noted the second hit through the submarine receiver. As I had only 2,200 amperes in the battery, I could not possibly make a further attack. I went down for half an hour and found bottom at 59 m. 20 minutes after the shot the British depth charges ceased to explode.
" 12.30 P.M.—Rose from bottom till I could use periscope on northerly course. Round about me, near by, many guardships. I immediately dived again. As I assumed they were following me with submarine sound receivers, I remained under water; continued till the large ship was safe. I proceeded north, then altered course to N.W. and then to west.
"3.51 P.M.—Rose to surface. The boat had 50 mm. pressure. As letting off air took too long, I ordered the helmsman to open the conning-tower hatch. The helmsman was blown out, and the central conductor which has a sail attached below, was blown against my arm and crushed it against the top of the conning-tower. The pain was so great that I fainted for a moment. When I heard that the helmsman saw a number of ships, I crept on to the conning-tower and saw that south and astern was full of vessels. I attributed this activity to myself and dived away again, as I could no longer risk being seen.
"6 P.M.—Rose to surface. Far in the south a smoke cloud. I ran farther west, and as soon as my batteries were pretty well charged I sent wireless messages to all U-boats giving course and possibilities of attack on Vaterland. There was no object in my following any longer, as I could not have caught her up before the North Channel.
"July 21. 10.45 A.M.—U-boat in sight; ascertained to be ' U-B 64.' Approached within hailing distance. From exchange of experiences I learnt that the day before, at 2 hr. 30 mins. 4½ sec., ' U-B 64 ' saw the Vaterland sunk by my shot, capsising on port side." In conclusion, here is the description of a fight which "U 84," commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Rohr, had with a steamer which kept her guns hidden and hoped by deceiving the U-boat to be able to surprise and sink her:
" February 22, 1917. 1.50.—Tank steamer, about 3,000 tons, with course 250 degrees, in sight. Dived. Torpedo fired from second tube; missed by 700 m.; had underestimated way. Steamer turns upon counter course. Went down. Rose to surface. Stopped her with gunfire. Steamer stops, blows off steam, crew leave the ship in two boats.
" 2.30 P.M.—Approached under water. No armament. Boats, about 8—10, are away from steamer.
" 2.49 P.M.—Rose to surface near boats Which still try to pull away from U-boat.
"2.49 P.M.—Steamer opens fire from four guns. Dive. Conning-tower hit five times: one shot through the bridge, one above the aerials, the third (4.7 cm.) goes through the conning-tower, explodes inside, nearly all apparatus destroyed. Second officer of the watch slightly wounded. Fourth shot smashed circulating water tubes; fifth shot hit a mine deflector. Abandoned conning-tower. Central hatch and speaking tube closed. As the conning-tower abandoned, the boat had to be worked from the central space below the conning-tower. The lifeboats throw depth charges to a depth of 20 m. Switch and main switchboard held in place by hand. Electric lamp over magnetic compass goes out. Boat is top-heavy and oscillates round the transverse axis [because the conning-tower was filled with water]. A number of connections between the conning-tower and hull do not remain watertight. Owing to short circuit the following fail in quick succession: gyro-compass, lamp-circuit [for lighting], main rudder, means of communication, forward horizontal rudder jams. In spite of being 14 degrees down by the stern and engines going full speed, the boat sinks by the bows to 40 m.; compressed air. To get rid of the water, rapid expulsion of air to 20 m. to — degrees to load aft. Tank No. 1 gets no compressed air. All hands in the bows to avoid breaking surface. Torpedo coxswain and No. 1 (petty officer) even counter-flood forward. Boat falls 8 degrees by the bow, and sinks to 35 m. depth. Compressed air on forward tanks.
" Meanwhile the spray (from leaks in the conning-tower) is kept off the electric apparatus by sail-cloth, waterproofs, flags, etc. The watertight auxiliary switchboard is the saving of the boat. Boat sinks down by the stern again and threatens to break surface. Steering under water no longer possible.
" 3.10 P.M. — Compressed air on all tanks. Starboard electric engine breaks down. To the guns, clear oil motors, full speed ahead! "
The commander decided, as the boat could not remain under water, to rise to the surface and chance fighting the steamer.
"The steamer is 35 hm. off and opens fire at once. Shots all round the boat. One 7.5 and one 4.7 cm. shell hit the upper deck forward of the boat's 88 cm. gun. Second officer of the watch receives other slight wounds. Replied to fire, unfortunately without telescopic sight as the conning-tower is still full of water. Distance quickly increases to 50 hm. Then the steamer follows slowly. To starboard a destroyer which opens fire at 80 hm.; shots fall short. Put on cork jackets. The intention is to continue gunfire till the boat can be sunk in the neighbourhood of a sailing vessel 8 sea miles away, to save the crew from a Baralong fate."3.17 P.M.—The destroyer is a ' Foxglove,' but cannot steam faster than the boat. At about 75 hm. replied to fire. The ' Foxglove ' soon begins to try and avoid shots; is hit twice, and increases the distance. Her guns only carry about 75 hm.
"3.20 P.M.—Conning-tower can be made watertight; boat cleared; ammunition for gun cleared; except conning-tower, all damage can gradually be repaired. Course 165 degrees. The 'Foxglove ' follows in our wake. Steamer lost to view. At a pinch the boat can dive, but leaves a heavy oil track behind her. If no destroyer comes before night, the boat can be saved.
"6.50 P.M.—The ' Foxglove ' has approached to 70 hm. and opens fire again. Return fire: hit. Enemy sheers off and falls back to over 100 hm.
" 8 P.M.—Twilight. Pursuit out of sight. On account of oil track zig-zag course. Run into another oil track, turned to port and gradually on course of 240 degrees.''
The boat then began her return journey and reached home without further incident.
I myself had occasion to inspect "U84,' after her return from this expedition. I realised that it was little short of a miracle that, in spite of such heavy damage, she reached home. It was chiefly due to the assurance with which the commander handled his boat, the perfect co-operation of the whole crew in these trying circumstances, and the excellent practice made by the gunners, in connection with which it must be remembered that the height of the platform of a U-boat, on which the gun is mounted, is only 2 m. above the water-level, and that aiming is thereby rendered far more difficult. Lieutenant-Commander Rohr is, unfortunately, one of the many who have not returned from their voyages.
It would take too much space to quote extracts from other U-boat experiences, or to mention the names of all those who particularly distinguished themselves. Wherever in this war heroism is spoken of, it applies without exception to our U-boat commanders and their crews.